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Selfishness is seldom considered a group-beneficial strategy. In the
typical evolutionary formulation, altruism benefits the group,
selfishness undermines altruism, and the purpose of the model is
to identify mechanisms, such as kinship or reciprocity, that enable
altruism to evolve. Recent models have explored punishment as an
important mechanism favoring the evolution of altruism, but
punishment can be costly to the punisher, making it a form of
second-order altruism. This model identifies a strategy called
‘‘selfish punisher’’ that involves behaving selfishly in first-order
interactions and altruistically in second-order interactions by pun-
ishing other selfish individuals. Selfish punishers cause selfishness
to be a self-limiting strategy, enabling altruists to coexist in a stable
equilibrium. This polymorphism can be regarded as a division of
labor, or mutualism, in which the benefits obtained by first-order
selfishness help to ‘‘pay’’ for second-order altruism.
punishment  cooperation  mutualism  game theory  public goods
Selfishness is rarely described as a group-beneficial strategy.Selfish strategies are labeled as deviant, cheating, free-riding,
egoistic (1), but most of all, as undermining altruism and
cooperation (2). In contrast, altruistic and cooperative strate-
gies, almost by definition, benefit the group, often at the expense
of the individual actor (2). In the typical evolutionary model, the
invasion of selfish strategies into a group leads to the dissolution
of altruism. Examples include scroungers among foraging groups
(3, 4), infanticide of unrelated infants (5), sneaking worker
reproduction in eusocial insect colonies (6, 7), and failure to help
in territorial defense (8, 9). The experimental economics liter-
ature amply demonstrates the corrosive effects of selfishness in
human social interactions. In public-goods games, participants
start out moderately generous but quickly withdraw their coop-
eration in the presence of selfish cheaters (10–13).
Earlier evolutionary models focused on how altruism can
evolve through nonrandom interactions or guarded cooperation
in dyadic interactions (14–17). More recently, interest has
focused on punishment as a mechanism for maintaining altruism
in sizeable groups (10, 11, 13, 18–23). Punishment can be
effective in curtailing selfish behavior within a group, but it can
also be costly for the punisher, compared with cooperators in the
same group who do not punish, thereby qualifying as a form of
second-order altruism. Individuals who are altruistic in first-
order and second-order interactions are at a double disadvan-
tage (10, 23–25). The solution to this problem might lie where
least expected.
An often overlooked aspect of game theory is that selfish
individuals also have an incentive to punish other selfish indi-
viduals, thereby increasing the proportion of cooperators for
them to exploit. This behavior might seem hypocritical in moral
terms, but it makes sense as an evolutionary strategy. It can even
be looked upon as a division of labor, or mutualism, whereby
cheating during first-order interactions becomes a ‘‘payment’’
for altruism (punishment) in second-order interactions. A com-
bination of strategies (selfish punisher plus altruistic nonpun-
isher) that split the costs of first- and second-order altruism can
be superior to a single-altruist/punisher strategy that bears both
costs.
In an earlier computer simulation model (26, 27), we showed
that when first- and second-order altruism are modeled as
initially uncorrelated traits, a negative correlation robustly de-
velops between the two, although the size of the correlation
depends upon a number of parameters. Here, we present an
analytical model demonstrating how altruistic nonpunishers and
selfish punishers, through the benefit of division of labor, can
exist in a stable equilibrium.
The Model
First-Order Altruism and Selfishness. The model emulates an ex-
perimental economics game in which each member of a group is
provided an endowment, b, that can be kept or invested in a
public good. The combined investment in the public good is
multiplied by a factor, m, and distributed equally to everyone in
the group. The total payoff of each individual (the proportion of
the endowment kept for oneself plus one’s share of the public
good) is assumed to be linearly related to fitness. This scenario
can easily be related to biological situations, such as investing
effort in a hunt in which everything captured will be shared. The
model considers the two pure strategies of investing all (altruist)
or none (selfish) of one’s endowment. For a model that includes
a continuum of endowment strategies, see ref. 26. If p is the
proportion of altruists within a single group, then the increments
in the fitness of the altruists and selfish types after one round of
interactions is:
WApbm [1]
WSpbm  b [2]
Baseline fitness is ignored because it is the same for both types.
It is clear that in the absence of punishment, selfish individuals
always have the highest fitness within the group because all group
members obtain an equal share of the contributions from the
altruists, yet selfish individuals keep rather than donate b.
Therefore, an altruist would obtain a greater fitness by switching
to the selfish noncontributing alternative, resulting in a net
gain of
b p 1Nbm
(selfish gain of b minus the now share of the reduced group
payoff caused by the loss of a single altruist). However, the group
has the highest fitness when everyone is an altruist, resulting in
the classic prisoner’s dilemma situation.
Punishment. Now consider a method of social control in which
individuals can punish selfish group members at a personal cost
c, which results in the selfish individual losing its acquired energy
for a given round of the game. The cost is incurred for every
selfish member of the group, and punished individuals risk the
loss of their previously acquired energy (b  pbm) at a proba-
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bility equal to the frequency of punishers that reside in the
group. Punishment can be exhibited by either altruists or selfish
individuals, yielding four possible strategies (altruistic punishers,
selfish punishers, altruistic nonpunishers, selfish nonpunishers)
at frequencies of pap, psp, pan, and psn, respectively. In a single
group, the average fitnessW of the four strategies are as follows:
Wan pan pap)bm [3]
The fitness of altruistic nonpunishers (Eq. 3) is exclusively based
on the altruistic contributions of group members and remains
unaffected by punishment.
Wsn pan pap)bm  b1  pap p sp) [4]
The fitness of selfish nonpunishers (Eq. 4) is determined by the
sum of withholding cooperation b, and the exploitation of
altruists (pan  pap)bm, however, is only retained in the propor-
tion that punishers are not present in the group [1 (pap psp)].
Wap pan pap)bm  cp sn p sp) [5]
Altruistic punishers (Eq. 5) retain the same fitness as altruistic
nonpunishers yet bear a cost for punishing all selfish members
within the group.
Wsp pan papbm  b1   pap p sp 1N 
 c p sn p sp 1N [6]
Selfish punishers (Eq. 6) exploit the altruistic contributions of
group members yet punish all other selfish group members.
Punishment reduces the fitness of selfish strategies, lowering
their fitness within groups. However, punishers in turn have a
lower fitness than nonpunishers within the same group. The act
of punishment, taken by itself, can be regarded as altruistic
because punishers pay a personal cost to provide a benefit (the
removal of selfish individuals) that is shared by nonpunishers.
We will explore the dynamics of the model by first considering
two of the strategies and then adding additional strategies.
Altruistic Punishers vs. Selfish Nonpunishers. Altruistic punishers
and selfish nonpunishers form an unstable equilibrium with each
strategy exhibiting positive frequency dependence, as shown in
Fig. 1. Altruistic punishment can evolve if it begins above a
threshold frequency. However, its stability is eliminated with the
addition of altruistic nonpunishers, as shown in Fig. 2. By not
partaking in the costs of punishment, altruistic nonpunishers
outcompete altruistic punishers and undermine punishment,
resulting in the establishment of selfishness as an ESS (for
population trajectories, see Fig. 3). To summarize the model so
far, the viability of altruistic punishment requires two conditions:
their initial frequency must be sufficiently high, and second-
Fig. 1. Fitness plot of the average within-group fitness of altruistic punishers
at selfish nonpunishers at varying frequencies of altruistic punishers. Arrows
indicate the population trajectories at any given frequency. Altruistic punish-
ers maintain a fitness advantage and evolve to fixation when beyond the
bistable equilibrium point (pˆ) and visa versa for selfish nonpunishers.
Fig. 2. Fitness plot of the average within-group fitness of altruistic punish-
ers, selfish nonpunishers, and the invading altruistic nonpunishers strategy at
varying frequencies of altruistic punishers. At invasion at a frequency 0, the
fitness of altruistic nonpunishers resides above that of altruistic punishers by
the value of the cost of punishment c(psn). Arrows indicating the population
trajectories illustrate the failure of altruistic punishers to maintain the highest
fitness in their previous region of selective advantage, resulting in their
decrease in frequency and the establishment of selfish nonpunishers as an ESS.
Fig. 3. Triangle plot illustrating the population trajectories for altruistic
nonpunishers (AN), altruistic punishers (AP), and selfish nonpunishers (SN) at
all possible initial frequencies. Each corner represents the population as that
pure strategy. Both altruistic punisher and selfish nonpunisher strategies
exhibit positive density dependence, attracting populations to their respec-
tive corners. Under conditions of AP advantage, populations will approximate
the AP–AN axis, and because of the absence of the SN strategy both strategies
will exhibit equal fitness. The population will traverse the AN–AP axis via drift,
allowing the population to drop below the region of AP attraction and
become vulnerable to SN invasion and subsequent fixation.







order free-riding (altruistic nonpunishment) must be excluded as
a superior strategy.
To curtail second-order free-riding, punishment can be ex-
panded to include altruists who do not punish. This tactic is
vulnerable to third-order free-riding, leading to a seemingly
infinite regress (for a possible solution to this problem, see ref.
28). Alternatively, punishers can recoup their cost of punishment
by being selfish in first-order interactions.
Selfish Punishment. Selfish punishment is a self-limiting strategy that
provides a form of second-order altruism by punishing selfishness.
In the course of punishing all selfish individuals (including other
selfish punishers), selfish punishers remain restricted through neg-
ative density dependence, promoting altruism within groups. In a
simple two-strategy model, selfish punishers and altruistic nonpun-
ishers form a stable equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 4. Under certain




 c 1  pan 1N
Because selfish punishers refrain from expelling themselves




less chance of expulsion than a selfish nonpunisher within the
same group. Therefore, if the benefit of remaining in the group
b panbm
N
is greater than the cost of punishing all other selfish individuals
c1 psn 1N ,
the equilibrium between selfish punishers and altruistic non-
punishers remains stable. This equilibrium range is expanded
with increasing the values of b and m as well as increasing the
frequency of altruists residing in the group. Furthermore, de-
creasing group size N results in a greater discrepancy between
the chances of expulsion, favoring selfish punishers over selfish
nonpunishers within a group.
Groups comprising selfish punishers and altruistic nonpun-
ishers will reconstitute the stable equilibrium regardless of initial
frequencies, provided selfish nonpunishers are sufficiently
scarce in the population (Fig. 5; for population trajectories, see
Fig. 6). Once established, the within-group stability will maintain
altruism at a constant frequency in a multigroup population.
Discussion
The majority of evolutionary models of social behavior have
treated selfishness as an impediment to altruism (14, 16, 29, 30).
When punishment is modeled as a mechanism that facilitates the
evolution of altruism, the punishers are usually assumed to be
altruists (13, 18, 19–23). Additional mechanisms that might
facilitate the evolution of altruism include conformance trans-
mission within groups (31) and withholding cooperation from
Fig. 4. Fitness plot of the average within-group fitness of selfish punishers
and altruistic nonpunishers. Arrows indicate the population trajectories at any
given frequency. Both altruistic nonpunishers and selfish punishers exhibit
negative frequency dependence. Each strategy maintains a greater fitness
when present at low frequencies and loses the fitness advantage as that
strategy becomes more common, causing the population to settle at the stable
equilibrium point (pˆ).
Fig. 5. Fitness plot of the average within-group fitness of selfish punishers,
altruistic nonpunishers, and the invading selfish nonpunishers strategy at
varying frequencies of altruistic nonpunishers. Arrows indicating the popula-
tion trajectories illustrate that the selfish punisher and altruistic nonpunisher
equilibrium point (pˆ) remains resistant to the invasion of selfish nonpunishers
given b  panbm /N  c1  pan  1/N .
Fig. 6. Triangle plot illustrating the population trajectories for altruistic
nonpunishers (AN), selfish punishers (SP), and selfish nonpunishers (SN) at all
possible initial frequencies. Each corner represents the population as that pure
strategy. If selfish nonpunishers are sufficiently scarce, the population will
settle at the selfish punisher–altruistic nonpunisher equilibrium point. Under
conditions with a greater frequency of selfish nonpunishers, the population
will be attracted to the selfish nonpunisher corner.
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selfish individuals (32). In all of these models, the possibility that
selfishness might facilitate the evolution of altruism has been
largely overlooked.
Inherent in evolutionary game theory is reduction in the fitness
of selfish individuals with the increasing frequency of selfishness
within groups, which implies that selfish individuals, in addition to
altruists, have an incentive to punish selfishness (33). Selfish
individuals are in a better position to do so because they have
increased their fitness by their first-order interactions. Altruistic
punishment is the least-fit strategy within a single group because of
the double cost of first- and second-order altruism.
Here, we have shown that selfish strategies during first-order
interactions can provide a more stable form of punishment within
groups than altruistic punishers. Although thismodel is constrained
to one round of interactions, a multiround computer simulation
model with a continuum of altruism and punishment strategies (26)
reaches similar conclusions, resulting in a high frequency of altru-
istic nonpunishers and a low frequency of selfish punishers that
keep selfishness at bay. Consistent with predictions from the
analytic model presented here, as punishment costs rise or group
size is increased in the simulation model, punishers contribute less
toward cooperation in the simulation model, exemplifying the
tradeoff between first- and second-order altruism. Interestingly,
selfish punishers do not evolve to overexploit altruistic nonpunish-
ers beyond retrieving the costs of punishment.
A discussion of terminology is in order because the definition
of the terms ‘‘altruism’’ and ‘‘selfishness’’ are notoriously vari-
able (2, 34). For example, altruism is defined in terms of relative
fitness within groups in multilevel selection models and in terms
of absolute fitness in inclusive fitness theory models (35). When
an individual increases the absolute fitness of a recipient at an
absolute cost to itself, its behavior appears unambiguously
altruistic. Yet, when the same individual is paired with another
altruist, the trading of benefits makes the behavior appear like
a form of self-interested mutualism. Selfishness can be individ-
ually advantageous in a group without punishers but maladaptive
in a group with punishers, and so on.
We do not insist upon a given set of definitions (for a
discussion of pluralism in evolutionarymodels of social behavior,
see refs. 36–38), as long as sufficient information is provided to
translate among perspectives. We have based our definitions on
what takes place during each stage of a two-stage interaction.
Thus, contributing to a public good counts as altruistic, and
keeping one’s endowment counts as selfish during the first stage,
even though punishment during the second stage might cause
selfishness during the first stage to become maladaptive. Simi-
larly, punishment during the second stage counts as altruistic,
and failing to punish counts as selfish, even though the combined
two-stage strategy of selfish punishment can be selectively
advantageous within groups, given a sufficient number of altru-
istic nonpunishers. These definitions enable us to retain the
same definitions for behaviors during a single stage, as opposed
to changing definitions based on whether the behaviors are
advantageous or disadvantageous in various combinations. How-
ever, we acknowledged that the combination of selfish punishers
and altruistic nonpunishers can be viewed as an internally stable
mutualism and therefore self-interested in that sense of the word.
In most models of altruism, including altruistic punishment, the
altruistic behavior is selectively disadvantageous within groups and
requires the differential productivity of groups (between-group
selection) to be maintained in the population. The outcome de-
pends upon the balance between levels of selection. A trait that has
a large effect on collective fitness at a very small personal cost can
easily evolve by group selection (e.g., in randomly formed sizeable
groups), despite qualifying as altruistic, as the term is definedwithin
multilevel selection theory.
Some evolutionary models of social behavior result in multiple
local equilibria, which are internally stable by definition but can
differentially contribute to the total gene pool. Group selection
among local equilibria can result in social interactions that are
simultaneously good for the group and selectively advantageous
within groups. Conformance transmission can cause punishment
to become internally stable within groups (31). Our model
provides another way for punishment to become internally
stable, enabling groups with punishers to persist indefinitely and
out-compete groups without punishers over the long term.
Group selection might also favor the evolution of modifier traits
that adjust the internal equilibrium so that most individuals are
altruistic nonpunishers with only a few selfish punishers.
In nonhuman species, selfish punishment (which was termed
‘‘corrupt policing’’) has been observed in the tree wasp Dolicho-
vespula sylvestris. Workers that police the reproduction of other
workers are more likely to lay eggs themselves (7). Worker policing
in monogynous and monandrous colonies of the wasp Polistes
chinensis antennalis exceeds that predicted by relatedness and was
partly attributed to the immediate reproductive benefit of selfishly
laid eggs (39). Scrub jays that tend to steal caches from other jays
are also more defensive of their own caches, providing evidence of
selfish behavior as a self-limiting strategy (40).
Game theorists refer to a ‘‘replicator dynamic’’ as any process
whereby the most successful behavioral strategy increases in
frequency in a population, which includes but goes beyond
genetic evolution (41). The concept of selfish punishment there-
fore might apply to a diversity of human social systems, from the
Castellians of medieval Europe (42), to mafia-like protection
rackets, to the formal compensation of specialized punishers
(police) for their services. In psychological research, a study
using fictional scenarios to investigate altruistic punishment
revealed that individuals who were most inclined to cheat were
also most inclined to punish and spent more to punish, in part
because they had amassed more as a result of their selfish
behavior (33). We hope that our model stimulates interest in the
concept of selfish punishment in both humans and nonhuman
species.
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